Austin WrightNatural gas prices tracked by the USO benchmark for energy commodities spiked past 30 dollars per MMBtu at some constrained delivery points inside the PJM Interconnection during Winter Storm Fern in mid January 2026, exposing how fragile fuel supply chains become in extreme cold even as coal fired power plants kept the broader electric grid intact.
At a Glance
- Winter Storm Fern brought snow, ice and sustained sub zero temperatures from Texas to New England in mid January 2026
- Tennessee reported more than 245,000 customer outages at the storm's peak
- Coal generation across the Lower 48 rose from roughly 70 gigawatt hours per day to about 130
- Coal supplied up to 40 percent of electricity in the MISO region and about a quarter of generation in PJM
- Federal emergency orders preserved more than 17 gigawatts of coal capacity in 2025 that had faced retirement
A Grid Under Pressure but Largely Intact
The storm tested the nation's power system about as hard as weather can. Hospitals stayed lit, emergency services kept running, and most households held onto heat despite brutal cold stretching from the Gulf Coast to New England. That resilience did not happen by chance. It came down largely to dispatchable generation, coal chief among it, stepping up exactly when demand for electric heating spiked and reserve margins got thin.
Coal's Surge During the Coldest Days
Coal fired output nearly doubled during the worst of the storm, climbing from about 70 gigawatt hours per day to roughly 130 across the Lower 48. That jump mattered because it landed at the precise moment household heating loads were climbing fastest. In the Midcontinent Independent System Operator territory, coal covered as much as 40 percent of electricity during peak hours. In PJM, it handled close to a quarter of total generation. Neither figure reflects a backup role. Both point to coal functioning as a structural pillar of grid stability during the emergency.
Wind, Solar and Hydro Struggled in the Cold
Weather dependent generation did not fare as well. Turbines iced over or were shut down for safety, cutting into wind output. Solar panels sat under snow through shortened daylight hours, sharply reducing generation. Hydropower ran into frozen waterways and limited inflows. None of these sources is dispensable in the broader mix, but Fern made their seasonal limits obvious. Coal and other fuel secure plants filled the gap because they keep fuel stockpiled on site, insulating them from the same supply disruptions that hit natural gas delivery points and drove spot prices above 30 dollars per MMBtu.
Quick Facts
- Natural gas spot prices at constrained PJM delivery points exceeded 30 dollars per MMBtu during the storm
- Coal fired generation rose from about 70 to roughly 130 gigawatt hours per day nationally
- MISO drew up to 40 percent of its electricity from coal at peak demand
- PJM relied on coal for about one quarter of total generation
- DOE emergency orders under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act let select coal units run at higher output
Lessons Carried Over From Winter Storm Uri
Coal took much of the blame after Winter Storm Uri hit Texas in 2021, but later reviews found the bulk of the failures traced back to natural gas system freeze offs, not coal plant shortcomings. Coal operators used the years since to invest in winterization, secure fuel access and tighten operational readiness. Those investments showed up in the numbers during Fern. Federal regulators also acted directly: the Department of Energy issued emergency orders under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act allowing certain coal units to run at higher output to protect grid stability. Similar interventions in 2025 stopped the early retirement of coal plants in Colorado, Indiana, Washington and Michigan, keeping more than 17 gigawatts of firm coal capacity available rather than letting it shut down.
Why Coal Retirements Remain a Reliability Question
The Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation have both flagged the same risk: retiring coal capacity faster than it gets replaced by other dispatchable resources raises the odds of outages, especially in severe winter weather. That warning lands at a time when electricity demand is climbing quickly, driven by data centers, industrial growth and broader electrification. The cushion for error keeps shrinking. Today's coal fleet is not the coal fleet of a decade ago either. Plants now run with more advanced emissions controls, better efficiency and closer monitoring, and coal itself remains a core input for steelmaking, giving domestic production added economic weight beyond the power sector.
What Fern Suggests About Energy Reliability Ahead
Regions that retired coal capacity early have often seen higher electricity prices and more exposure to fuel price swings, since coal's stable costs and on site inventory offer a form of price protection many households no longer have during weather emergencies. Fern reinforced a simple point: when the grid faced its sharpest test, coal did not play a supporting part, it carried a large share of the load. The open question going forward is whether utilities and regulators keep enough firm, dispatchable capacity, coal, gas, nuclear and whatever new technology emerges, online before winters like this one become routine rather than exceptional.
